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TELEMEDICINE TODAY AND TOMORROW:
WHY "VIRTUAL" PRIVACY IS NOT ENOUGH
Christina M. Rackett*
Introduction
Today's telemedicine technology may conjure up thoughts of sci-
ence fiction fantasies,' but it has existed since the 1950s.2
Telemedicine, or "remote electronic clinical consultation, '3 permits
patients and doctors in different locations to communicate with
each other for diagnostic or educational purposes. Communication
is accomplished through the use of everyday means, such as tele-
phones and fax machines,4 as well as more sophisticated tools, in-
cluding electronic stethoscopes, high resolution cameras, 5
interactive television or computer lines,6 and satellites.7
Telemedicine benefits patients in underserved,8 remote areas9 by
increasing access to quality and specialized medical care. For ex-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University, 1998; B.A., summa cum laude, New York
University, 1995. The author thanks John, Trudy, and Kimberly Rackett for their
tireless support and encouragement, and Jaie Solis for his infinite patience.
1. For example, telemedicine can enable a doctor in one location to direct robotic
equipment to perform surgery on a patient in another location. See Marilyn Hanzal,
Telemedicine: 'Beam Me Up, Doctor', CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 20, 1996, at 5.
2. See Douglas D. Bradham et al., The Information Superhighway and
Telemedicine: Applications, Status, and Issues, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 145, 149
(1995). The first telemedicine project was an interactive audio system which linked
seven hospitals in Nebraska, Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota for weekly
mental health lectures. See id.
3. Telemedicine Research Center, What Is Telemedicine (visited Sept. 26, 1996)
<http://tie.telemed.org>.
4. See Phyllis F. Granade & Jay H. Sanders, Implementing Telemedicine Nation-
wide: Analyzing the Legal Issues, 63 DEF. CouNs. J. 67, 67 (1996).
5. See id.
6. See Tony Cappasso, Telemedicine: The Latest Technology Is Bringing Doctors
and Far-Away Patients Closer Together, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, I11.), Aug. 4, 1996, at
15.
7. See Telemedicine Research Center, supra note 3.
8. For a discussion of why there is a shortage of physicians in rural areas, see
generally Daniel McCarthy, Note, The Virtual Health Economy: Telemedicine and the
Supply of Primary Care Physicians in Rural America, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 111 (1995).
9. These locations include primarily rural and inner city areas, which often lack
sufficient available medical care; prisons and mental health institutions, where trans-
porting sick patients to outside doctors requires extra staff and brings security risks;
and nursing and private homes, where patients may not be able to travel to doctors
unaided. See Elizabeth Neus, Telemedicine Hailed as Future Wave of Industry But
Detractors Claim Barriers Doom Idea, Hous. POST, Mar. 19, 1995, at A5.
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ample, a general practitioner in a rural town can link via
telemedicine to a cancer specialist at a prestigious urban medical
center for immediate advice on how to most effectively treat a pa-
tient. The use of telemedicine to share medical expertise and cut-
ting-edge procedures has already saved lives.'"
Telemedicine also decreases the cost of medical care to isolated
patients" by reducing patients' and physicians' transportation
costs,' 2 and by limiting needless tests and duplication of records.13
In addition, telemedicine's ease in delivering speedy care allows
physicians to treat remote patients before symptoms worsen, and
before huge medical bills amass. 14
Telemedicine's benefits,' 5 however, are hampered by unresolved
patient privacy issues. Because of the easy access, duplication,
and linkage capabilities of telemedicine technology, confidential
10. A doctor in an urban hospital recently directed a rural doctor through his first
amputation surgery via video, thereby saving the patient's life. See Telemedicine Re-
search Center, supra note 3. In addition, at least six lives have been saved in Texas
due to telemedicine. See Sharon Mcllrath, The Bottom Line (Telemedicine, Part 4), 38
No. 17 AM. MED. NEWS, May 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10008741. See also Spen-
cer Rich, Battlefield Medicine Turns Electronic, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1996, at A25
(discussing a United States Army estimate that one-third of American casualties dur-
ing the Vietnam War could have been saved if there had been an advanced
telemedicine program in place).
11. One study estimates that $80 billion spent on American health care could be
saved annually by using telemedicine. See Jim Barlow, Telemedicine Faces Struggle,
Hous. CHRON., Apr. 30, 1995, at 1. In addition, American hospitals currently save 14
to 22 percent per year due to videoconferencing. See Marcia H. Pounds, Future Is
Now for Videoconferencing, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 23, 1996, at
1F.
12. Because telemedicine enables medical services to be rendered without travel,
it reduces instances of lost wages and lost time. See McIlrath, supra note 10; see also
Telemedicine Research Center, supra note 3. Patients need not compensate doctors
for "windshield time" spent commuting to a small town to deliver services. See
Mcllrath, supra note 10.
13. See Neus, supra note 9, at A5.
14. See Kathleen M. Vyborny, Legal and Political Issues Facing Telemedicine, 5
ANNALS HEALTH L. 61, 63 (1996).
15. Other benefits of telemedicine are educational and legal. For example, a doc-
tor in a Texas hospital was prevented from delivering babies because the nurses' neo-
natal credentials had expired. The nurses then participated in telemedicine video
training, received the required credentials, and were able to assist the doctor in 15
deliveries in nine months. See Mc~lrath, supra note 10. In addition, telemedicine may
lessen medical malpractice liability by enabling doctors to quickly tap important infor-
mation regarding a patient's condition and medical history, thus resulting in more
accurate diagnoses. See Rodd Zolkos, Telemedicine Calls Liability Risks Into Ques-
tion, Bus. INS., Oct. 21, 1996, at 3.
16. For an outline of other legal problems surrounding telemedicine, including li-
censing and medical malpractice issues, see Robin E. Margolis, Law and Policy Barri-
ers Hamper Growth of Telemedicine, 11 No. 10 HEALTHSPAN 14, 15 (1994).
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patient data may be intercepted and misused by non-medical insid-
ers, such as billing clerks and insurers, as well as outside hackers. 17
As a result, particularly vulnerable patients, such as those with
AIDS or mental illness, may be denied jobs, credit, insurance, s or
even their dignity.' 9 Telemedicine patients are not adequately pro-
tected against such invasions of privacy because states' medical
confidentiality requirements are not uniform.20 As a result, pa-
tients are subjected to varying levels of protection depending upon
where they live 2' or where their doctor is licensed.
This Note demonstrates the need for federal telemedicine legis-
lation that provides uniform confidentiality protection for all
telemedicine patients. Part I details the use of telemedicine and
outlines the link between telemedicine and privacy issues. Part II
discusses current federal and state privacy law, emphasizing the
laws that protect medical information. Part III argues that federal
telemedicine legislation is necessary to safeguard the confidential-
ity of patients' medical records and proposes a uniform law that
protects the privacy of telemedicine patients in every state. This
Note concludes that without federal legislation, telemedicine will
wither, along with isolated patients' hopes of one day receiving
quality and affordable medical care.
I. Telemedicine's Rise and Impact on Patient Privacy
Forty years ago, when telemedicine was experimental, doctors
conferred with each other by telephone.22 Today, medical data,
comprised of both text and images, can speed across state lines in
seconds. Although this improved technology delivers much
needed medical care to remote patients in inner cities and rural
areas, there are also negative by-products. More people than ever
can access patients' personal health information electronically, in-
cluding those who should not be privy to such information, such as
17. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 61 and 73 and accompanying text (describing victims humili-
ated by the unauthorized disclosure of their personal health information).
20. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in
the Emerging Health Care System, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 13 (1995) ("State privacy
laws do exist, but they are not uniform .... ").
21. In California and New York, for example, doctors are prohibited from disclos-
ing the names of HIV-positive patients' sexual partners to the state, while in Colorado
and Minnesota, such disclosure is mandatory. See Barry B. Cepelewicz, Telemedicine:
A Virtual Reality, But Many Issues Need Resolving, 13 No. 9 MED. MALPRACTICE L.
& STRATEGY 1, 3 (1996).
22. See Bradham, supra note 2, at 149.
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unauthorized "curiosity seekers" 3 and clever hackers.2 4 Such un-
authorized access can have disastrous personal and professional
consequences on victimized patients.25
A. The Development of Telemedicine
Telemedicine's beginning in the 1950s was slow, but steady.26
Doctors progressed from case consultation via audio equipment for
educational purposes2 7 to communicating with patients via closed-
circuit telephone systems 28 and closed-circuit televisions.29 Major
developments in early telemedicine were made by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).3 °
23. A recent survey of health care professionals by the Healthcare Information
and Management Systems Society found that "[flour of 10 respondents identified in-
ternal curiosity seekers' as the No. 1 [security risk], while only 17% identified external
breech [sic] of security by compuier hackers [as a concern] . . . ." John McCormack,
Conference Survey Confirms Internet, Intranets Are Red Hot, HEALTH DATA MGMT.,
Mar. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8747811.
24. See infra note 60.
25. See infra notes 65-68.
26. See Leslie G. Berkowitz, Is There a Doctor in the House?, 25-JUN COLO. LAw.
19, 19 (1996) ("After a slow evolution using the telephone and fax machines, we are
now moving to distance education and remote electronic clinical consultation.").
27. See Bradham, supra note 2, at 149 (describing weekly teleconferencing lec-
tures linking seven hospitals in four different states).
28. By 1961, psychiatrists were conducting group "telepsychiatry consultation[s]"
with distant patients via telephone. See id.
29. See Cappasso, supra note 6, at 15. For example, in 1967, employees and travel-
ers at Logan International Airport received medical treatment from doctors at Massa-
chusetts General Hospital via two-way audiovisual microwave equipment. See
Telemedicine Research Center, History of Telemedicine (visited Sept. 26, 1996) <http:/
/tie.telemed.org>.
30. See Telemedicine Research Center, supra note 29. Beginning in the 1960s,
while missions were in progress, the agency "telemetered" physiological readings
from both the spacecraft and the astronauts' space suits. See id. NASA later shared
its advances in satellite technology in experimental telemedicine programs in remote
areas of Arizona and Alaska. See id. The 1972-1975 Arizona program, Space Tech-
nology Applied to Rural Papago Advanced Health Care [STARPAHC], consisted of
a paramedic van supplied with microwave and audio transmission equipment which
linked Indian patients on the Papago Reservation to specialists in distant hospitals.
And in Alaska in 1971, NASA's first Applied Technology Satellite was used to bring
health care to patients in 26 remotes sites via video consultation. See id. In addition,
NASA has lent its expertise to several disaster relief efforts abroad. The Space
Bridge to Armenia program was launched in 1989 to bring United States specialists to
earthquake victims in Armenia via telemedicine. The project was later expanded to
provide treatment for burn victims after a massive railway accident in Ufa, Russia.
See id.
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Today, telemedicine has gained widespread support and use.3'
The federal government and thirteen states spent a combined $100
million on telemedicine projects in the 1980s.32 During a single pe-
riod between 1994 and 1995, federal and state contributions to
telemedicine and similar advancements were estimated to reach
more than $100 million.33 Sixty percent of all telemedicine projects
in this country's hospitals have been developed within the past two
years,34 and twenty-nine percent of rural hospitals were predicted
to use telemedicine by the end of 1996.35
Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services, in an
attempt to increase isolated, underserved patients' access to quality
and affordable medical care, announced a decision to spend $42
million in developing 19 telemedicine projects in 13 states.36 In ad-
dition, the National Library of Medicine awarded Washington's
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center a $2.8 million contract 37 to
study issues in telemedicine and other communication technolo-
gies. President Clinton signed the Health Centers Consolidation
Act in late 1996,38 which will award $36 million in grants to rural
telemedicine developers in 1997 and perhaps more through 2001.
Interstate and even international telemedicine projects are flour-
ishing. For example, doctors in Minnesota, Florida, and Arizona
are linked via the Mayo Clinic's satellites for consultation pur-
poses. 39 The Caribbean 4° and Bosnia 41 represent two sites 42 of in-
31. One commentator credits improved technology for the boon. See McCarthy,
supra note 8, at 115 ("The resurgence of telemedicine has become possible only be-
cause of recent developments in technology .... [T]he new systems are smaller, less
expensive, and are of increased quality.") (citation omitted).
32. See Ray Dussault, Telemedicine Poses Regulatory Woe, Bus. J.-SACRAMENTO,
Apr. 22, 1996, at 21 (citing a 1995 American Medical Association report). The private
sector is spending millions on telemedicine as well. See id.
33. See Berkowitz, supra note 26, at 19.
34. See Telemedicine Programs Spreading Like Wildfire: But Is It Premature to
Embrace the New Technology?, BACK LETTER, May 1, 1996, at 54.
35. See id. (referring to an Office of Rural Health Care Policy study).
36. See Telemedicine Demonstration Project for Medicare Gets HHS Funding,
MED. UTILIZATION MGMT., Oct. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10524253.
37. See -Lane Cooper, Telemedicine Market in Embryonic Stage, WASH. TECH.,
Oct. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11557362. The money will be used to develop
"telemedicine computer home stations," in which parents at home can watch their
sick infants eat and sleep in the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit. Id. In addi-
tion, when the infants finally leave the hospital, they can still be observed by the
doctors via these monitors. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 254c (1997).
39. See Ira Breskin, Telemedicine Gains Ground, But Hurdles To Use Remain, IN-
VESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct. 10, 1995, at A8.
40. See Telemedicine Research Center, What's New (visited Sept. 26, 1996) <http://
tie.telemed.org>. Massachusetts General Hospital and the Howard University Col-
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ternational telemedicine programs that bring quality care to
remote patients.
In response to the telemedical boom, groups such as the Center
for Telemedicine Law,43 the Telemedicine Research Center,4 and
the Congressional Ad Hoc Steering Committee on. Telemedicine
and Health Information 45  were established to further
telemedicine's development and to study privacy and other issues
46
arising from the new technology. In addition, numerous web sites
devoted to telemedicine issues can be found on the Internet.47
Commentators in the healthcare and telecommunications indus-
tries expect telemedicine to continue to flourish,48 making remote
consultation "commonplace" in fields that rely on images, such as
radiology, pathology, and ultrasound.49 Video consultation is pre-
lege of Medicine are cutting patient travel costs and inconvenience while simultane-
ously providing specialist care to the Caribbean. Id.
41. See Cooper, supra note 37. A United States Army station in Maryland is using
telemedicine to observe the troops' health overseas. Id.
42. For a detailed account of current telemedicine programs nationwide, see
Bradham, supra note 2, at 152-59.
43. Telemedicine News: The Quest for Answers to Difficult Legal Questions, AUTO-
MATED MED. PAYMENTS NEWS, Dec. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2281351. The
Center, founded in 1995 by the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, the Mayo Foundation,
the Midwest Rural Telemedicine Consortium, and Texas Children's Hospital, studies
legal issues that affect telemedicine. Id.
44. See Telemedicine Research Center, About the TRC (visited Sept. 26, 1996)
<http://tie.telemed.org>. The Center is a non-profit organization founded in 1994 to
further the development of telemedicine. Id.
45. The Committee was formed to tackle telemedicine issues at the federal level.
See Implementation of Telecommunication Reforms a Boon to Health Care Providers,
GoV'T PRESS RELEASES, Jun. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8788123.
46. The Center for Telemedicine Law, for example, is focusing on licensing and
reimbursement questions. See AUTOMATED MED. PAYMENTS NEWS, supra note 43.
47. See, e.g., <http://tie.telemed.org> (sponsored by the Telemedicine Research
Center), <http://www.arentfox.com/telemedicine.html> (sponsored by the Washing-
ton, D.C. law firm of Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn), <http://www.fcc.gov/Re-
ports/telemed.txt> (sponsored by the government), and <http://
www.telemedmag.com> (providing on-line TELEMEDICINE AND TELEHEALTH NET-
WORKS magazine).
48. See, e.g., Telemedicine: Fad or Future?, LANCET, Jan. 14, 1995, at 73. "Con-
servative" projections of the sales of telemedicine and similar equipment, amounting
to just $77 million in 1995, are estimated to approach $100 billion in five years. See
Cooper, supra note 37. In addition, research and development continues to move
forward. For example, the Pentagon is developing "battlefield telemedicine" for the
future. See Rich, supra note 10, at A25. The plan includes helmet-mounted cameras
to be worn by medics on the scene, which would transmit images of the injured back
to doctors in a distant location. Also in the works are personnel status monitors, to be
worn by all soldiers, which would transmit any changes in vital signs, as well as posi-
tions on the battlefield, to distant medics and doctors. Id.
49. See LANCET, supra note 48, at 73.
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dicted to reach more remote areas in the future, such as Antarctica
and space stations.5 °
B. The Link Between Telemedicine and Privacy
Telemedicine's risks to patient confidentiality and security of
medical information stem from its reliance on computer technol-
ogy to store, transmit, and retrieve medical records and images.
Modern technology permits downloaded information to be ac-
cessed, copied, and even forwarded elsewhere with just a few
strokes on a computer keyboard.51 Currently, an estimated 80 peo-
ple view a patient's health information during a patient's single
rendezvous with the health care system.52 These individuals may
include not only medical personnel, but hospital administrators, in-
surers, researchers, employers, and law enforcement officers.53
Even though some of these individuals are authorized to access pa-
tients' confidential health information, they may fail to guard it
properly.54 In addition, the physicians' obligations of confidential-
ity in the Hippocratic Oath55 and the American Medical Associa-
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Community Health Management Information Systems Resource
Center, Health Information Systems and Privacy (visited Sept. 26, 1996) <http://
chmis.org/> ("In an electronic environment.., unique risks are present from simulta-
neous access to information from remote areas of the country, ease of duplication and
transfer, and the ability to more easily link various systems of records.").
52. See id. These individuals may include not only health care personnel like doc-
tors and nurses, but also hospital administrators and insurance companies.
53. See Hearings on Medical Records Confidentiality Before the Subcomm. on
Gov't Management Information and Technology of the House Comm. on Government
Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. (June 14, 1996) (statement of Janlori Goldman,
Deputy Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology), available in 1996 WL
10164954 ("Information demands of insurance companies, managed health care com-
panies, researchers, employers and law enforcement are eroding the doctor-patient
confidentiality that is central to health care.") [hereinafter Hearings].
54. See Robert Landauer, Histories That Hurt, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 17,
1996, at D09 ("[Doctors' and hospitals'] offices are awash in untrained personnel who
don't understand how to screen out information that should not be released.").
55. The part of the oath referring to the physician's duty of confidentiality states:
"And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well as outside
my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not be published
abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secret." Robert M. Gell-
man, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection of
Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 267 (1984) (citing 1 HIPPOCRATES 164-65 (W.
Jones trans., 1923), reprinted in ETHICS IN MEDICINE 5 (S. Reiser, A. Dyck & W.
Curran eds., 1977)).
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tion's Code of Medical Ethics do not bind these non-medical
personnel.56
Telemedicine's broad access capabilities could increase the
number of individuals who are privy to patients' electronically
transmitted medical records, 57 sparking new fears that the informa-
tion may be intercepted and misused with even greater ease.58
Current safeguards do not provide adequate protection.59 Hack-
ers, both clever outsiders as well as disgruntled insiders, can break
into systems and obtain confidential information.6" Numerous
cases of misuse of personal health information have been docu-
mented. For example, a New York Congresswoman had her medi-
cal records, including information about her depression and a
suicide attempt, faxed to the media in the midst of her political
campaign.61 In Colorado, a medical student sold patients' confi-
56. The 1992 Code states: "The physician should not reveal confidential communi-
cations or information without the express consent of the patient ...... Bernard
Friedland, Time to Re-Examine a Venerable Concept in Light of Contemporary Society
and Advances in Medicine, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 249, 257 (1994) (citing AM. MED. Ass'N,
CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, No. 5.05
(1992)).
57. See James Rosenblum, Medical Liability in Cyberspace, 8 HEALTH LAW. 10, 10
(1995) ("If physician[s'] offices are linked to local hospitals ... nurses, billing clerks,
data processing clerks, etc.[,] will have easy access to extensive amounts of medical
information.").
58. See Diane M. Gianelli, Physician Input on Pressing Ethical Issues, AM. MED.
NEWS, July 22, 1996, at 3; see also Ilene K. Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the
Global Information Superhighway: A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
275, 332 (1995) (citing National Research Council, Computers at Risk: Safe Comput-
ing in the Information Age (1991)) ("We are at risk. Increasingly, America depends
on computers .... The modern thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun.
Tomorrow's terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a
bomb."); Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48
VAND. L. REV. 295, 310 (1995) ("[T]he 'threats and personal harm' from disclosure of
health records 'are real and not numerically trivial.") (citation omitted).
59. Current safeguards, such as passwords and access codes, are flawed in that
they are inconvenient and not one hundred percent effective. See Hanzal, supra note
1, at 5.
60. For example, the Pentagon was the victim of 160,000 security breaches of its
computer files in 1995. See Diane M. Gianelli, supra note 58, at 3; see also Terri F.
Arnold, Note, Let Technology Counteract Technology: Protecting the Medical Record
in the Computer Age, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & Errr. L.J. 455, 464 (1993) (describing
numerous abuses including the disclosure of a woman's AIDS diagnosis to her fellow
employees via information on the hospital computer); Sonya Savkar & Robert J. Wa-
ters, Telemedicine-Implications for Patient Confidentiality and Privacy (visited Aug.
27, 1996) <http://www.arentfox.com.telemedicine.html> (discussing a 1988 breach of
an Arizona hospital's computer system by outsiders, and detailing the crimes of infa-
mous hackers Kevin D. Mitnick and Mark Abene).
61. See Hearings, supra note 53.
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dential medical records to malpractice attorneys.62 And the per-
sonal problems of some employees who enlisted the aid of
employee assistance programs were publicized throughout the
workplace.63
Hackers have a large incentive to misuse patients' confidential
health information because it can be a valuable commodity to em-
ployers, insurers, and others. The potential brokering of this infor-
mation is therefore quite likely, 64  and quite dangerous.
Unauthorized use of this information can have serious conse-
quences on the patient's personal and professional life. 65 Employ-
ers might refuse to hire someone whose medical condition will
likely generate expensive medical bills.66 A psychiatric patient
could rationally fear that disclosure of his or her records, "if in the
wrong hands, could ruin a job opportunity, harm [his or her] repu-
tation, or prevent [him or her] from changing insurance compa-
nies."'67 Other cases include instances where individuals were
denied employment, insurance, adoption rights, education, or entry
into armed services based on health information that they had or
could have a certain disease.68
The public is well aware of these dangers. Eighty-five percent of
respondents to a 1993 poll believed that health care reform should
pay attention to the "absolutely essential" or "very important" goal
of protecting medical records' confidentiality, a goal they ranked
higher than supplying the uninsured with health insurance. 69 Al-
62. See id.
63. See Tamar Lewin, Questions of Privacy Roil Arena of Psychotherapy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 1996, at Al.64. See Savkar & Waters, supra note 60. The financial incentives for selling per-
sonal information are great. See Judith B. Prowda, Privacy and Security of Data, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 738, 741 (1995) (noting that the annual profits of the personal
information brokering industry are estimated at $3 billion).
65. See Savkar & Waters, supra note 60, at n.4 ("[I]mproper disclosure [of health
information] can deny an individual access to these basic necessities of life, and can
threaten an individual's personal and financial well-being.") (citing U.S. Congress,
Office of Tech. Assessment, Protecting Privacy in Computerized Medical Information
(1993)).
66. See Linda Kloss, Patients Must Protect Selves, Join Debate on Keeping Medical
Records, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 12, 1996, at 19A.
67. See Hearings, supra note 53. Out of fear of such occurrences, some patients
ask their doctors to abstain from taking notes. See id.
68. See Landauer, supra note 54, at D09 (referring to incidents cited by Rep. Jim
McDermott of Washington).
69. See Community Health Management Information Systems Resource Center,
Information Privacy: Autonomy and Informed Consent (visited Sept. 26, 1996) <http://
chmis.org/> (citing a survey done by Louis Harris and Associates and Dr. Alan
Westin).
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most nine out of ten think computers aid others to illegally acquire
personal information about them.70 As a result, more than two-
thirds want limitations on the use of all computerized information,
health-related or otherwise.71 Some individuals, fearful of the lack
of health care confidentiality, would avoid seeking treatment
altogether.72
11. Current Privacy Law
The United States Constitution does not provide for an explicit
right of privacy. Rather, the Supreme Court has upheld the right
to privacy against governmental invasions under the First,7
Fourth,74 Fifth,75 and Ninth Amendments,76 the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 and the penumbra of free-
doms in the Bill of Rights.78 Some states provide for an explicit
right to privacy in their constitutions. 79 Others, following the fed-
eral government's lead, do not.8" The result is a patchwork of fed-
eral and state laws governing the somewhat amorphous right to
privacy.
70. See id. In fact, according to a 1992 survey, twenty-five percent of the public
believe that their personal medical information had already been wrongfully dis-
closed. See Hearings, supra note 53.
71. See id.
72. See Community Health Management Information Systems Resource Center,
Primer on Privacy (visited Sept. 26, 1996) <http://chmis.org/> (citing a 1993 survey of
adolescents performed by the University of Massachusetts Medical Center); see also
Adriana Jenkins, Mental Health Providers Form Market Network, BOSTON Bus. J.,
May 24, 1996, at 1 (describing how many therapy patients feel "uncomfortable know-
ing that their therapist may give personal details of their sessions to an HMO," a
procedure commonly practiced in order to determine if patients qualify for additional
therapy sessions). This fear of exposing personal information extends to other areas
as well. See also Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress
Or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 206 (1992) (citing a 1990
report indicating that a "significant percentage" of those surveyed avoided applying
for jobs, credit, or insurance for fear of revealing personal information).
In medicine, the potential public health consequences of this fear could be tremen-
dous. For example, a future disease carrying the same social stigma as AIDS could be
disastrous if victims, fearing exposure, were unwilling to seek treatment.
73. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
74. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
75. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
76. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
77. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
78. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
79. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Arkansas' state constitution.
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Although the courts and Congress have made numerous efforts
to protect patients' confidential medical records in case law8 and
legislation, 82 health information is not given explicit federal privacy
protection.83
A. General Federal Privacy Law
Justice Brandeis defined the right to privacy both as "the right to
be let alone" and "the right most valued by civilized men."84 Be-
ginning in 1965, the Supreme Court has recognized an implied right
to privacy in the Constitution85 and has attempted to define the
parameters of that right.86 The right to privacy encompasses at
least two similar freedoms: the freedom to avoid disclosure of pri-
vate matters, or the right to confidentiality, and the freedom to
make important personal decisions, or the right to autonomy.87
Both federal courts88 and Congress 89 have protected the right to
confidentiality. The Federal Privacy Act of 1974 requires that fed-
eral agencies, including federally-funded hospitals, adhere to spe-
cific privacy standards in the collection, use, and disclosure of
81. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
83. See Hearings, supra note 53 ("Presently, there is no comprehensive federal law
that protects peoples' health records."). And the battle rages on. See Rory J.
O'Connor, Online Privacy Is Hottest Issue on Capitol Hill: Lawmakers Offer Varied
Measures, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Feb. 9, 1997, at A10 ("Privacy, or more specifically the
lack of it in an online world, is the new hot topic on Capitol Hill.").
84. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
85. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965) (striking down a statute prohib-
iting use of contraception, discussing a "zone of privacy").
86. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (upholding a right to
choose one's own profession); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(upholding a right to choose how to educate one's children); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (upholding a right to choose whom to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-56 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to determine whether to terminate her
pregnancy).
87. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558-59 (2d Cir. 1983) (uphold-
ing the city's financial disclosure law for public interest reasons).
88. See id. at 1559 ("Most courts . . .appear to agree that privacy of personal
matters is a protected interest .... .") (citations omitted). Cases which have dealt with
the confidentiality aspect of the right to privacy include Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977) (upholding a New York prescription reporting law), Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (upholding an act which provided for separation
of former President Nixon's personal documents from official ones), and Eisenbud v.
Suffolk County, 841 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding a county's financial disclosure
law, despite its privacy implications, because of the public's interest in avoiding con-
flicts of interest of government employees).
89. See, e.g., Federal Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988)).
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personal information. 90 For example, agencies are prohibited from
disclosing an individual's record without the prior consent of that
individual.91
Courts have also protected the right to autonomy, focusing on
respecting personal decisions made in marriage,92 procreation,93
contraception, 94 family relationships, 95 and child rearing and edu-
cation.96 The autonomy right guards against governmental intru-
sion into personal matters affecting the person, such as the right to
refuse medical care. 97
B. Federal Health Care Privacy Law
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court,98 have noted the
right of individuals to keep their health information private.99 The
Court of Appeals in United States v. Westinghouse set forth seven
widely-used factors to determine if a disclosure of personal infor-
90. See id. The act does not apply to private actors, and is therefore typical of
federal privacy law. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
91. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). There are many exceptions to this rule. See, e.g.,
§ 552a(b)(1) (permitting disclosure to agency employees who have a need for the in-
formation to do their job); § 552a(b)(3) (allowing disclosure in the course of "routine
use"); § 552a(b)(4) (permitting disclosure to the Bureau of Census for survey pur-
poses); § 552a(b)(5) (allowing disclosure to an individual who requests the informa-
tion for statistical purposes); § 552a(b)(6) (permitting disclosure to government
agencies for historical preservation purposes); § 552a(b)(8) (allowing disclosure if
there has been "a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the health of safety
of [another]"); § 552a(b)(9) (permitting disclosure to the legislature and its commit-
tees); § 552a(b)(12) (allowing disclosure to consumer agencies).
92. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
93. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
94. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
95. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944).
96. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
97. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The princi-
ple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
98. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600.
99. See United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (allowing em-
ployees' medical records to be disclosed to the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health after prior notice is given to the individuals).
"[A]n employee's medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a
personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy
protection. Information about one's body and state of health is matter
which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the 'private en-
clave where he may lead a private life."'
Id. at 577 (citation omitted). See also Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d
Cir. 1994) (holding that an HIV positive individual whose medical status was dis-
closed in a press release has a right to privacy in his condition).
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mation is an invasion of privacy.1°° The Westinghouse test weighs
the public interest in disclosure against an individual's right to pri-
vacy.10 1 Courts have not hesitated to hold against the individual
where public health concerns were at issue. 10 2
Congress has also attempted to protect the privacy of patients'
health information. Current federal privacy statutes include drug
and alcohol treatment laws10 3 and rules mandating the confidential-
ity of Medicare recipients' hospital records.10 4 The laws apply to
government agencies and government-funded entities. 5
An individual's medical records, however, receive less federal
protection than his or her video rental records. 0 6 As a result, nu-
merous federal laws have been proposed to increase safeguards for
confidentiality of medical records. The Medical Records Confi-
dentiality Act of 1995107 intended to "[e]nsure personal privacy
100. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578. Those factors question
"the type of record requested, the information it does or might contain, the
potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of
need for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articu-
lated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward
access."
Id.
101. See id. at 578 ("[A]s in most other areas of the law, we must engage in the
delicate task of weighing competing interests.").
102. See Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Authority, 72 F.3d 1133, 1143 (3rd Cir.
1995) (applying the Westinghouse factors to find in favor of an employer over its HIV-
positive employee's privacy right in his medical records).
103. See The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment'Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2
(Supp. V 1993). The Act limits disclosure of patient information to three situations:
to medical personnel during emergencies (§ 290dd-2(b)(A)), to researchers and audi-
tors (§ 290dd-2(b)(B)), and to those authorized by a court for good cause (§ 290dd-
2(b)(C)). Violators of the Act are punishable by fines. See id. § 290dd-2(f). The law
provides strict confidentiality bars on the release of patient information by treatment
programs.
104. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.1 (1982). Hospitals can release the records if required by
federal or state law, a court order, or a subpoena. See id. § 482.24(b)(3).
105. The laws do not apply to private actors. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a); 42 C.F.R.
§ 482.1.
106. See Schwartz, supra note 58, at 311. See The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2710 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Act prohibits disclosure of personally
identifiable information from the sale or rental of videocassettes. The bill protects
individuals' privacy in detail, mandating the destruction of old video records within
one year (§ 2710(c)(4)(e)) and providing for the preemption of state laws
(§ 2710(c)(4)(f)).
107. S. 1360, 104'" Cong. (1995). The Act was referred to the Committee on Labor
and Human Resources on October 24, 1995, and hearings were held November 14,
1995. See United States Bill Tracking, available in WESTLAW, 1995 U.S. S.B. 1360
(SN).
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with respect to medical records and healthcare-related informa-
tion," and the McDermott Bill'0 8 intended to protect "privacy of
health information in the age of genetic and other new technolo-
gies." The Medical Records Confidentiality Act would mandate
that doctors obtain a patient's written, detailed consent before dis-
closing the patient's records, whether for treatment or payment
purposes or not.10 9 The act provides for civil penalties of up to
$250,000 and criminal penalties of up to $500,000 and ten years in
prison for improper disclosures. 11° The McDermott Bill prohibits
use and disclosure of health information unless the patient grants
consent for that specific use. 1 ' It provides for penalties similar to
those of the Medical Records Confidentiality Act. 112 The 104th
Congress adjourned before passing either bill.
Legislators and medical professionals have also introduced
measures to regulate the confidentiality of medical records. In
1985, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws proposed the Uniform Health-Care Information Act,113
which defines medical data as sensitive information and details dis-
closure procedures, such as a prohibition against any release of in-
formation without the patient's written authorization. 14 This Act
has been adopted in two states.' 5 In addition, the Federation of
State Medical Boards of the United States recently suggested that
states adopt "A Model Act to Regulate the Practice of Medicine
Across State Lines,"'1 16 requiring that the privacy laws of the state
in which the model act is passed apply in telemedicine procedures,
regardless of the location of patient records.17
108. H.R. 3482, 10 4th Cong. (1996). The Bill was introduced on May 16, 1996, and
referred to the House Committees on Commerce and Government Reform and Over-
sight on the same day. See United States Bill Tracking, available in WESTLAW, 1995
U.S. H.B. 3482 (SN).
109. See supra note 107 §§ 202-03. Currently, patient records may be disclosed for
other purposes, such as research, without the individual's consent. See supra note 91.
110. See id. §§ 301, 302, 311.
111. See supra note 108 § 201.
112. See id. §§ 301 and 311.
113. Unif. Health-Care Information Act § 1-101-2-105 (1996). The act recognizes
that "[tjhe movement of... health-care information across state lines, access to and
exchange of health-care information from automated data banks, and the emergence
of multi-state health-care providers creates a compelling need for uniform laws, rules,
and procedures governing the use and disclosure of health-care information." Id. § 1-
101(5).
114. Id. § 2-101(a).
115. The two states are Montana and Washington. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-
501 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.02.005 (West 1992).




C. State Laws Regarding Protection of Medical Information
Because the United States Constitution prevents only govern-
mental invasions of privacy, Congress allows states to create their
own laws to protect their citizens from private actors." 8 California,
Florida, and Colorado are among a handful of states that enacted
such laws. 119 The lack of uniform regulation results in medical pri-
vacy laws which vary greatly from state to state.12 °
At least ten states guarantee their citizens an express, albeit gen-
eral, privacy right.1 21 Eight states have developed comprehensive
medical confidentiality laws.122 Some states have medical confi-
dentiality laws which have little practical effect because they are
118. See Leslie Sandberg, Legal and Policy Issues Challenge Telemedicine, HEALTH
MGMT. TECH., Dec. 1. 1995, at 30, available in 1.995 WL 10024718.
119. See, e.g., Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (1994)
(holding that the California Constitution's privacy clause "creates a right of action
against private as well as government entities"); Heda v. Superior Court, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Rasmussen v. Southi Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533, 536-37
(Fla. 1987). A Colorado statute provides criminal penalties for those who knowingly
and impermissibly appropriate another's health information for personal use. See
Mark L. Gordon & Diana J.P. McKenzie, The Lawyer's Roadmap of the Information
Superhighway, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177, 191 (1995).
120. For example, the majority of
"states do not have a comprehensive statute that protects the confidentiality
of all health information. The legal standard governing the collection and
use of health information may depend on the type of information collected
... the individual or institution collecting it... and whether the information
is required by a third party for purposes of payment."
Community Health Management Information Systems Resource Center, Health In-
formation Systems and Privacy (visited Sept. 26, 1996) <http://chmis.org/>.
121. These states are: Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22), Arizona (ARIz. CONST.
art. II, § 8), California (CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12,
23), Hawaii (HAw. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-7), Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12), Louisi-
ana (LA. CONST. art. I, § 5), Montana (MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10), South Carolina
(S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10), and Washington (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7). See Frank C.
Morris, Jr., E-Mail Communication: The Next Employment Law Nightmare, 20 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS J. 49, 51 (1995). Some of these states allow for civil
penalties for those who disclose confidential information. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 110/15 (West 1997).
122. These states include Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. Landauer,
supra note 54, at D09. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 1751, §§ 1-22 (1996); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 5-37.3-1-3-11 (1956); Wis. STAT. § 146.82 (1995). The comprehensive
Rhode Island medical confidentiality laws apply to private actors, including physi-
cians, and clearly require patient consent before health information can be disclosed.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-1-3-6 (1996). There are, however, exceptions to the
necessity of obtaining patient consent. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (1996). Califor-
nia and Montana have passed comparable laws. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 56.10 & 56.11
(West 1997); MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-525 & 50-16-526 (1996). California's com-
prehensive set of health care privacy protection laws even treats eavesdroppers on
doctor-patient discussions as felons. See Marianne Lavelle, Health Plan Debate Turn-
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not mandatory. 123 Other states protect only citizens having certain
health conditions carrying a particular social stigma, such as alco-
holism or HIV.124
All fifty states require that physicians report specific communi-
cable diseases and sexually transmitted diseases to the state gov-
ernment. 125 Many of those states require that such reports remain
confidential 126 and inaccessible to the public.127 Forty-nine states,
however, permit disclosure of this information in certain situations,
including cases where individuals are exposed to infectious or sexu-
ally transmitted diseases. 28 Some states are more specific than
ing to Privacy, NAT'L L.J., May 30, 1994, at Al; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 636
(West 1997).
123. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 192.525 (1996), encouraging doctors and hospitals
to "adopt voluntary guidelines" to protect patients' records from unnecessary disclo-
sure. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651(16) (1997). The statute simply provides
for general patient confidentiality guidelines for hospitals and nursing homes ("Pa-
tients and residents shall be assured confidential treatment of their personal and med-
ical records . . ").
124. These states are: Alabama, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah. Marianne
Lavelle, State Laws a Patchwork Quilt, NAT'L L.J., May 30, 1994, at A17. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 22-11A-54 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101 (1996); IOWA CODE
§§ 125.37 & 141.23 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 222.271 & 214.625 (Michie 1996);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 20047 & 19203-D (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 8-601 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111B, § 11 (1996); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-30-33 & 41-34-7 (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-11 (Michie 1996); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3793.13 & 3701.243 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 1690.108 & tit. 35, § 7607 (West 1996); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 85.115 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-12-284 (1953). California and New
York provide the greatest privacy protection for HIV-infected citizens. Lavelle, supra,
at A17 (citing U.S. Representative Gary Condit of California). See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120980 (West 1997) (punishing individuals who willfully
or negligently disclose HIV test results, causing the patient to experience "economic,
bodily, or psychological harm").
125. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Public Health Information Infrastructure: A
National Review of the Law on Health Information Privacy, 275 J. AM. MED. Ass'N
1921, 1923 (1996).
126. These states include Florida, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Vermont. See id. at 1923. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.25 (West 1997); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111D, § 6 (West 1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.15 (West
1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-10-113 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1099 (1996).
127. The laws of Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, and
North Carolina make such provisions. See Gostin, supra note 125, at 1923. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.120 (Michie 1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254 (West 1997);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-91-11 (1996);
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 89 (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-374 (1996).
128. See Gostin, supra note 125, at 1923. States which permit the notification of the
infected person's spouse or sexual partner include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
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others about situations when disclosure is permissible. 29 Only a
handful of states provide both criminal and civil penalties for unau-
thorized disclosure of health information. 130
California is the only state to develop legislation specifically ad-
dressing privacy concerns in telemedicine.'3 ' The Telemedicine
Development Act of 1996132 requires that a patient give his written
and verbal consent before receiving telemedicine treatment and
before his identifiable images and/or data are disclosed to others,
including researchers. 13
3
III. A Whole New Set of Rules
Current federal law is ineffective in dealing with the new privacy
problems raised by telemedicine. State laws are not uniform and
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id.
at 1924-25. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-11A-38 (1996); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-
1457 (West 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-27-302 (Michie 1995); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 121015 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1405.5 (West
1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-584 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.2416
(West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-610 (1997); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-41-7-3 (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 141.6 (West 1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-6004 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.282 (Michie 1996); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.14 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 214.25 (West 1997);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-1 (1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-501.02 (1996); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 441A.220 (Michie 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-C:18 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:4-41 (West 1997); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1997);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-144 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.5-02 (1997); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-528 (West 1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609 (West 1997);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-146 (Law. Co-op. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-10-115
(1996); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103 (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-6-3.5 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-3C-3 (1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-133 (Michie 1997).
129. California and New York are among the states which meticulously list all pos-
sible justifications for disclosure, while Nebraska and Oregon provide only general
disclosure laws. See Gostin, supra note 125, at 1924. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 56.10 (West 1997) and N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 18 (McKinney 1997) with NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-668 (1996) and OR. REV. STAT. § 192.525 (1996).
130. See Gostin, supra note 125, at 1924-25. This small number of states includes
California, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oklahoma. See id. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 120980 (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2638 (West
1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.769 (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.2
(West 1997).
131. See Pamela J. Podger, Legislators Push for Surgery on Telemedicine, THE
FRESNO BEE, May 18, 1996, at B1. The bill, 1995 CA S.B. 1665, was signed into law
by the governor on September 24, 1996, and is known as the Telemedicine Develop-
ment Act of 1996. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2290.5(c)(5) (West 1996).
132. Id.
133. Failure to obtain patient consent is considered "unprofessional conduct" by
the practitioner. See id. Those found guilty of such conduct are subject to disciplinary
action by the Division of Medical Quality. See id. § 2234.
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may provide limited or no protection at all for medical informa-
tion, let alone electronic health data transmitted via telemedicine.
Although the proposed federal laws' and California's
Telemedicine Development Act of 1996135 are good first steps,
telemedicine requires a whole new set of rules. The prevalence of
computer technology in telemedicine makes it easier than ever to
access, duplicate, and even transmit private patient images and
data for improper purposes. As a result, the best solution for safe-
guarding patient medical information is federal medical confidenti-
ality legislation that addresses the specific privacy issues raised by
telemedicine.
A. Privacy Problems Unique to Telemedicine
Telemedicine's reliance on computer technology to send and re-
ceive confidential patient health information raises unique privacy
concerns that existing laws cannot solve. 36 As a result of transmit-
ting personal patient health data electronically, telemedicine in-
creases the number of individuals who have, or can obtain, access.
Patient information is threatened not only by unauthorized insid-
ers, but also by outside hackers. Those with access can easily copy
or forward patient information. The results can be disastrous, not
only for the patient himself, who may experience personal and fi-
nancial harm, 37 but also for future patients, who may refrain from
reaping the benefits138 of this new technology for fear of losing
their privacy. 139 As telemedicine continues to grow,140 this prob-
lem is not likely to solve itself.
B. Federal Protection Is Inadequate
Telemedicine patients receive limited protection from the federal
government. Because federal laws such as the Federal Privacy Act
of 1974141 generally apply only to government disclosures of pri-
vate medical information,'14 2 it is possible that they may protect
only five percent of all medical data.143 The majority of medical
134. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
141. Supra note 89 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
143. See Schwartz, supra note 58, at 315 (referring to a 1980s estimate).
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data, viewed by private actors such as hospitals, insurance compa-
nies, and health care providers, 44 are left unprotected.
Current federal laws on medical information and privacy also
contain many loopholes, including permitted disclosure for "rou-
tine use"'1 4 5 by a government agency. In some instances, it is un-
clear whether federal guidelines are even followed or enforced. 46
The Federal Privacy Act, for example, does not provide for an en-
forcement agency.' 47
The Supreme Court has expressed concern about the inability of
current confidentiality laws to provide sufficient protection from
technology's advances.148 Congress' advisory agency, the Office of
Technology Assessment, agreed in its 1986 report, which revealed
that "use of new electronic technologies in processing, comparing,
and linking personal information has eroded the protections of the
Privacy Act."' 49 Furthermore, the provision of specific drug and
alcohol laws 50 indicates an understanding by Congress that "the
[confidentiality] rules for ordinary medical records are either not
well defined or are too weak,' 5 ' and that patients need special
safeguards to prevent adverse reactions from employers, insurers,
and others in the face of unauthorized disclosures.
C. State Privacy Laws Conflict
State laws are also incapable of handling the privacy concerns
arising from the widespread use of telemedicine. The very nature
144. See id. at 315.
145. See id. at 318 (There are at least 38 "routine uses" that fit into the Federal
Privacy Act's "routine use" exception.) (citation omitted); see also supra note 99. The
existence of loopholes to privacy laws may be particularly dangerous in HIV-positive
patient cases. Disclosure of those patients' status can be justified as necessary for
individual and public health. See Roger Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality of
HIV-Related Information: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health
Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REV. 111, 145 (1994).
146. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 55, at 276 (referring to unlikelihood that Medi-
care Act's confidentiality mandates are strictly adhered to) (citation omitted).
147. See Kathleen A. Linert, Note, Database Marketing and Personal Privacy in the
Information Age, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 687, 698 (1995) (citing JAMES
MICHAEL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (1994)).
148. In his concurrence in Whalen twenty years ago, Justice Brennan stated that
restraints on the advancement of computer technology might be needed in the future
to prevent misuse of information about individuals. 429 U.S. at 607 ("The central
storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for
abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will
not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology.").
149. See Prowda, supra note 64, at 746 (citation omitted).
150. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
151. See Gellman, supra note 55, at 277.
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of telemedicine requires that patients' confidential medical infor-
mation move across state boundaries. As a result, it is unclear
whether the privacy laws from the patient's state of residence or
those from the diagnosing doctor's state apply. This distinction is
important because states have taken different approaches to pro-
tect the medical data of their citizens. 152 For example, a California
patient and an Arkansas patient treated by the same New York
specialist via telemedicine may each receive two different stan-
dards of privacy protection. 53 A uniform confidentiality standard
would eliminate any conflict of laws problems by creating predict-
ability and certainty, thereby encouraging the increased use of
telemedicine by patients and doctors.
D. Proposed Laws Are Flawed
Many proposed federal laws have stalled and died in Con-
gress.154 Although these proposals represent attempts to grapple
with the increasing privacy concerns related to telemedicine, many
fall short of adequately protecting patients' medical confidentiality.
The Medical Records Confidentiality Act of 1995155 is flawed be-
cause too many groups, including public health agencies, research-
ers, and large companies, would continue to have authorized access
to patient medical information, 156 leaving unsolved the problems
of insider access and broad loophole exceptions. 57 In addition, be-
cause the bill does not preempt federal drug and alcohol treatment
laws and state mental health laws, 58 it does not create a uniform
152. See supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text; see also Reidenberg, supra
note 72, at 229 ("Like the federal industry-specific laws, each state law generally seeks
to resolve a narrow problem within a given industry and does not systematically ad-
dress all the privacy concerns relating to the acquisition, storage, transmission, use
and disclosure of personal information.").
153. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 107.
156. See West's Legal News 96, Jan. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 257854; see also
Prowda, supra note 64, at 761.
157. See Medical Records Confidentiality Act, supra note 107 § 203(e). Patient
consent before disclosure is not required in the following instances: when creating
nonidentifiable information for a health information service (§ 204); when releasing
information to patient's next of kin (§ 205); in emergencies (§ 206); when releasing
information to oversight committees (§ 207); when releasing information for public
health reasons (§ 208); when releasing information for health research (§ 209); when
releasing information for judicial and administrative purposes (§ 210); when releasing
information for non-law enforcement subpoenas (§ 211); and when releasing informa-
tion for law enforcement purposes (§ 212). See Beverly Woodward, Patients' Privacy
at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at A23.
158. See THE HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 400-01 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1996).
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standard. Telemedicine patients with certain conditions may be
guaranteed privacy protection, while others may be ignored and
left vulnerable to wrongful disclosure.
The Uniform Health-Care Information Act' 59 has been adopted
by only two states and also provides numerous exceptions to the
patient consent requirement before disclosure. 160 In addition, each
state can make changes to the law before adoption,16' perpetuating
the current scheme of varying laws from state to state.
The Model Act proposed by the Federation of State Medical
Boards 62 is inadequate because it fails to establish a universal stan-
dard for patients in all states. The Act applies only confidentiality
laws of the state in which the act is passed. As a result. patients in
differing states will still be subject to varying protections. Further-
more, the act provides sanctions only for those physicians who
practice medicine in another state without being licensed in that
state.163 The act mentions no available sanctions against those who
make unauthorized disclosures.
E. Proposal: The Need for Model Federal Legislation
Today's privacy laws provide inconsistent and inadequate protec-
tion for patient health information. Because of broad access capa-
bilities to electronically transmitted medical data, telemedicine
patients are left particularly vulnerable. As a result, uniform fed-
eral 'legislation is necessary to protect the confidentiality of
telemedicine patients' medical information. 64 To most effectively
safeguard against unauthorized and inappropriate disclosure of
electronic medical data, federal legislation must be comprehensive,
filling the loopholes that other privacy protection attempts have
left open.
First, the law must apply to both government and private actors.
Current federal privacy laws ignore that private parties handle the
159. See Unif. Health-Care Information Act, supra note 113 and accompanying
text.
160. See id. § 2-104. Disclosure without authorization is permitted in nine situa-
tions, including disclosure to health-care providers for treatment (§ 2-104(a)(1)) or
education purposes (§ 2-104(a)(2)); to immediate family members (§ 2-104(a)(5)); to
researchers (§ 2-104(a)(7)); and to penal institution officials (§ 2-104(a)(9)).
161. See Schwartz, supra note 58, at 322.
162. See Model Act, supra notes 116-17.
163. See id.
164. Such federal legislation regulating private actors in the practice of interstate
telemedicine may be justified under Congress' commerce clause authority. See U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) ("Where economic activity substantially affects inter-
state commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
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majority of patient medical information. 165 Legislation must spe-
cifically apply to doctors, administrators, office workers and clerks,
insurers, researchers, and all others who access, use, and maintain
personal health information. These individuals must be bound by a
code of ethics similar to the physicians' oaths developed by Hip-
pocrates 166 and the American Medical Association. 167 All medical
and non-medical personnel, from doctors to administrators, must
receive training about the heightened risks involved in electronic
records, the highly sensitive nature of patient health information,
the dangers inherent in improper disclosure, 68 and the necessity of
obtaining the patient's informed consent for disclosure. They
should sign confidentiality clauses outlining their duty of privacy to
their patients.169
The federal law must also codify and elaborate on the principles
of fair information practices.170 These principles include that: (1)
information should be collected only for the purpose for which it is
intended; (2) information should not be used for a different pur-
pose without the patient's consent; (3) information should be dis-
carded when it is no longer needed to fulfill that purpose; and (4)
individuals should be informed of how the information will be
used.' 7 '
The first, second, and fourth principles indicate that federal legis-
lation must set forth a scheme of informed consent, where the phy-
sician educates the patient about his or her rights to prevent
disclosure of private medical images and data and the potential
risks of disclosure. Some telemedicine providers have already used
this practice. 72 The consent form must clearly detail the intended
use of the information and must inform the patient of exactly who
165. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
167. See id. and accompanying text.
168. See Francoise Gilbert, How to Minimize the Risk of Disclosure of Patient Infor-
mation Used in Telemedicine, 1 TELEMEDICINE J. 91, 93 (1995).
169. See id. The duty should consist of a promise to use patient information for
intended purposes only, and to obtain patient consent before releasing such data to a
third party. Id. at 93.
170. The Federal Privacy Act of 1974 was based upon these principles. See Gostin,
supra note 20, at 25. The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems developed these principles in 1972 in reaction to individuals' lack of
control over records containing their personal information. See Community Health
Management Information Systems Resource Center, Primer on Privacy (visited Sept.
26, 1996) <http://chmis.org/>.
171. See Gostin, supra note 20, at 25.
172. See Bradham, supra note 2, at 166 n.63 ("Some telemedical practitioners re-
quire their patients to sign a 'statement of understanding for videoconsultations.'")
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will have access to his or her health information. 173 The patient
must be informed of the risks of disclosure in telemedicine practice
before the telemedical consultation begins. The consent form must
also outline the patient's legal recourse, should his or her confiden-
tiality be breached.
The third principle requires the development of explicit provi-
sions for the destruction of data used in telemedicine. 17 4 Once the
original purpose of obtaining the information is attained, all trans-
mitted data must be completely erased. This would eliminate the
possibility of a subsequent breach of the patient's privacy.
In addition, strong security safeguards, such as encryption, 75
password programs, and handprint recognition and retina scanning
technologies, 76 must be required to prevent unauthorized outsider
and insider access. 77 Telemedicine providers should be required to
use protections equal to the "state of commercially available tech-
nology. ' ' 178 A monitoring system must be created to ensure that
telemedicine providers are adequately protecting their patients'
(citation omitted); see also supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the in-
formed consent requirement of California's Telemedicine Development Act of 1996).
173. This system has proven successful for at least one hospital. Employees are
told that "all patients will receive a list of all employees that had access to their medi-
cal records. The move has resulted in much less voyeurism among employees .... .
See McCormack, supra note 23.
174. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 168, at 93-94. Destroying the images and text sent
between locations should not violate state medical records retention laws, because the
originals would continue to be maintained by the referring physician.
175. Encryption "protect[s] digital information by scrambling data using mathemat-
ical procedures that make it extremely difficult and time-consuming for anyone other
than authorized recipients ... to recover the plain text of the message. 'Strong' en-
cryption ... guarantees that the information will be safe even if it falls into hostile
hands." Conrad Burns, Development of Internet Services Hurt by Export Encryption
Policy, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1996, at 5.
176. These technologies "store images of the unique identifying parts of the human
hand or eye so a system later can identify [authorized] computer or network users."
Addressing Security in the Networking Era, HEALTH DATA MGMT., Nov. 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 9609831.
177. It is true, however, that some current safeguards do not always offer sufficient
protection. See Hanzal, supra note 1, at 5. Yet without some form of effective encryp-
tion, "medical information is readily available to anyone interested in obtaining it."
On-Line Security Issues, 1996: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Science, Technology and
Space of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, (June 26, 1996)
(statement of Robert G. Gargus, President, Atalla), available in 1996 WL 10829264.
178. The Health Law Resource, American Health Information Management Associ-
ation Language for Model Health Information Legislation on Creation, Authentication
and Retention of Computer-Based Patient Records (visited Sept. 26, 1996) <http://
www.netreach.net/-wmanning>. Generally, longer mathematical formulas with no
"back doors," or ways for insiders (or hackers) to bypass a system's normal login
procedure, provide the greatest encryption protection. Burns, supra note 175, at 5.
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confidentiality. Policing duties may be assigned to hospital institu-
tional review boards ("IRBs"), which are already experienced in
safeguarding patients' privacy. 179
Finally, legislation must establish strong penalties for the unau-
thorized disclosure or misuse of patient information. The stringent
civil and criminal sanctions of the proposed Medical Records Con-
fidentiality Act of 1995, which provide for penalties up of to
$500,000 and 10 years in prison, may serve as a model. g0
Federal legislation is the best alternative to safeguard patients'
medical information used in telemedicine. It is not, however, fool-
proof. No matter what procedures are required by law, the confi-
dentiality of patient data cannot be guaranteed one hundred
percent. 181 Health care personnel may defy their duties and con-
tinue to carelessly or intentionally invade their patients' right to
privacy.8 2 Hackers may elude security mechanisms in place.'83
Some groups may even prefer to leave strong state laws in place
over a diluted federal protection.'"" Federal legislation, however,
is a good beginning, taking steps to uniformly protect the confiden-
tiality of patient medical information transmitted by telemedicin6.
Conclusion
Current laws have not kept pace with emerging telemedicine
technology. Federal laws are inadequate in protecting patients'
medical privacy. State laws provide inconsistent and conflicting
standards of patient confidentiality protection. As a result,
telemedicine patients are exposed to abuse and misuse of their pri-
vate health information. The consequences of maintaining the sta-
tus quo are enormous: telemedicine will be stifled, access to
179. See Duncan Neuhauser, Comment, More Tales From Institutional Review
Boards, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 153, 154 (1994). IRBs review institutional research
projects to ensure that participating patients are protected via informed consent and
confidentiality safeguards. Id.
180. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
181. See HEALTH DATA MGMT., supra note 176 ("There is no silver bullet to secur-
ity issues .... Protecting health data and networks is a combination of doing many
different things. But even then, you do not have absolute insurance.") (quoting Wil-
liam M. Miaoulis, an information security officer at the University of Alabama
Hospital).
182. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
184. Some AIDS advocates, for example, would rather have a federal standard pre-
empt just weak state confidentiality laws than preempt all state confidentiality laws.
Lavelle, supra note 122, at Al (emphasis added). For example, AIDS patients in
California are given strict protection that a federal law might not be able to duplicate.
See, e.g., supra note 124 (citing California HIV privacy law).
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affordable primary and specialist care will be denied, lives will be
lost, money will be wasted, and rights will be violated. The best
solution is a comprehensive, national privacy protection law that
guarantees all telemedicine patients the same confidentiality stan-
dard. Only then will the law allow patients sufficient safeguards to
take advantage of the new frontier of telemedicine.
AStwo -S Alf/
ET
